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Philosophy and Theology

These reflections focus on the following topics: (1) em pirical evaluations o fthe
efficacy o f intercessory prayer for recovery o f health, (2) an argum ent about poten
tiality and personhood, and (3) a critique o f the consistency o f a pro-life position.

Empirical Evaluations o f the Efficacy o f Intercessory Prayer
As contem porary debates indicate, the relationship o f religion and science
rem ains a contentious one in the m inds o f m any scholars. In a sense, faith— w hich
by definition is not sim ply know ledge— seem s opposed to any kind o f em pirical
justification. Yet at tim es Scripture itself seem s to appeal to em pirical justification
in order to dem onstrate the pow er o f God. The prophet Elijah challenges the priests
o f Baal to pray to their god to set aflame a sacrifice, taunting them w hen nothing
happens that perhaps their god is sleeping. Elijah vindicates his b e lie f in the God
o f A braham when, after prayer, God delivers a fiery consum ption o f the sacrifice
(1 Kings 18: 20-39).
Scripture enjoins believers to pray for the sick. “Is any among you sick? L et him
call for the elders [presbyters] o f the C hurch and let them pray over him , anointing
him w ith oil in the nam e o f the Lord; and the prayer o f faith w ill save the sick man,
and the Lord w ill raise him u p ” (James 5: 14-15). Is there any em pirical evidence
to suggest th at prayer for others does indeed aid them in regaining health?
In his article, “Just A nother Drug? A Philosophical A ssessm ent o f R andom 
ized C ontrolled Studies on Intercessory Prayer” (Journal o f Medical Ethics , A ugust
2006), philosopher D erek Turner takes up this topic. He appeals to philosophical
and theological grounds in questioning w hether such studies are ethically perm is
sible, by (1) considering the problem s o f obtaining inform ed consent from patients
participating in the studies; (2) noting that intercessors, i f they act in accordance
w ith th eir religious beliefs, should subvert the studies by praying for patients in the
control groups; and (3) arguing that intercessors and scientists m ust take incom pat
ible view s o f the causal relationship betw een prayer and healing.
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Turner’s article, like a host o f other articles treating the possibility o f prayer
to promote healing,1 raises important questions about empirical demonstrations o f
the power o f prayer. One o f Turner’s concerns is that believers have a religious
obligation to include the control group in their prayers, thereby subverting the
study. He writes:
Indeed, if I were a Christian recruited to one of the prayer teams, and if an ex
perimenter asked me to offer specific prayers for several patients assigned to
the intercessory prayer group, I would have qualms. Surely God cares about the
suffering of all the patients in the study. Why should I pray for some but not for
others? Would a good Christian not pray for everyone who is in need? I, at least,
would be tempted to follow the experimenter’s instructions, and then sneak in an
extra request at the end, “Please, God, take care of those in the control group, too.”
Of course if the volunteers did this, that would subvert the entire study—but this
is arguably what the volunteers should do, if they are Christian. (489)

This concern seems misplaced. It is true that Christians have a duty to love ev
eryone, but this general obligation does not translate into a particular duty to help
every individual. As Aquinas notes in the Summa theologiae, “absolutely speaking
it is impossible to do good to every single [person]: yet it is true o f each individual
that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity
binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do
good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do
to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all,
for unbelievers as well as for the faithful.”12 Just as we have no obligation to donate
to every single charity (despite our obligation to donate to some particular charity
if we have the means), so we have no obligation to pray for every single person
in particular. In the intercessory experiment, we have no obligation to pray for the
control group in particular. Praying for people in general, since this would include
both the control group and the intercessory group equally, does not threaten the
scientific validity o f the results.
Turner is correct, however, to point out that there may be still other people,
not officially participating in the study at all, whose prayers render problematic the
empirical findings. In other words, perhaps relatives or friends o f the control group
pray for them and in that way corrupt the scientific validity o f the study.

1The most systematic study of this question of which I am aware is David R. Hodge,
“A Systematic Review of the Empirical Literature on Intercessory Prayer,” Research on
Social Work Practice 17.2 (March 2007): 174-187. For a limited sample of the studies
cited by Turner, see D. A. Mathews, S. M. Marlowe, F. S. MacNutt, “Effects of Intercessory
Prayer on Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” Southern Medical Journal 93.12 (December
2000): 1177-1186; L. Leibovici, “Effects of Remote, Retroactive Intercessory Prayer on
Outcomes in Patients with Bloodstream Infection: Randomized Controlled Trial,” British
Medical Journal 323.7327 (December 22-29, 2001): 1450-1451; R.C. Byrd, “Positive
Therapeutic Effects of Intercessory Prayer in a Coronary Care Unit Population,” Southern
Medical Journal 81.7 (July 1988): 826-829.
2Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, Q 31.2, reply 1.
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The question o f m easuring em pirically the pow er o f intercessory prayer faces
at least tw o obstacles unnoticed by Turner. The first is that— unlike m edications
th at have chem ically identical pow ers— intercessors them selves m ay not be equally
efficacious in prayer. Scripture and tradition seem to indicate that not all persons
share equally in sanctity. W hy should we assum e that the prayers o f the devout and
the lukew arm are equally efficacious? Since it is im possible to m easure a person’s
holiness, it is im possible to control for the variations in the efficacy o f prayer. In
addition, even the same person m ay pray on one occasion w ith m ore fervor, con
centration, and self-giving than on another— again, factors w hich m ay be relevant
for w hether a prayer is granted but w hich cannot be em pirically m easured.
Second, it is controversial (and I believe false) to assum e that G od’s answering
o f prayer w orks in the same w ay as a m edicine curing a disease. The chem ical ef
ficacy o f a particular m edication does not depend on the free choice o f an individual.
By contrast, God freely chooses to grant or not grant a prayer request. G od is not
a divine puppet over whom , through the strings o f prayer, we can exercise control.
Rather, w hatever it is that God wills, it is not our prayer that makes God act, again
unlike a m edication that makes certain chem ical reactions take place. Rather, God
freely w ills to grant certain requests on condition that we pray for them . In other
words, i f w e believe that God chooses freely or that God is pure actuality w ith no
potentiality w hatsoever, then prayer cannot exercise a kind o f causal pow er over
God. I f an orthodox view o f G od is correct, it w ould seem to follow that one cannot
m easure the efficacy o f prayer through any em pirical test o f causal effectiveness.

Potentiality and Personhood
Taking on the central issue o f personhood in “Probability Potentiality” ( Cam
bridge Quarterly o f Healthcare Ethics, A pril 2007), C hristopher N obbs attem pts to
chart a m iddle course betw een those who argue that personhood rests on the poten
tiality o f a being to achieve self-aw areness, and theorists such as Peter Singer who
hold th at personhood begins som etim e after birth w hen self-aw areness is actually
achieved. Curiously unm entioned are those who disagree w ith both views, namely,
those w ho hold that personhood is contingent upon neither actual self-awareness nor
potential self-aw areness, but rather the rational nature o f the being in question. On
this view, even a severely handicapped hum an child w ith no potentiality to achieve
self-aw areness is still a person.
N obbs holds that actual persons m ust be self-aware, but also that those who
are potential persons in his view — such as hum an babies— have some value because
they are highly likely to achieve personhood. Just as a lottery ticket w ith a fiftyfifty chance o f being w orth a m illion dollars is extrem ely valuable (as calculated
by rational decision theory, 50 percent x $1 m illion = $500,000) but not as valuable
as one m illion dollars itself, so too the hum an infant is not equal to a person and
yet is o f such high value that parents m ay not neglect or kill the child because o f
the probability that the infant w ill becom e a person. W ith the application o f a kind
o f rational decision theory to the question o f w hen hum an life becom es valuable,
N obbs attem pts to m aintain the self-aw areness view o f personhood and yet not
sanction the m oral perm issibility o f infant neglect.
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Several difficulties face this proposal. Obviously, the probability o f an infant
reaching p ersonhood m ust be conceived independently o f detrim ental hum an
intervention. O therwise, parents could neglect or kill the infant at will, since the
probability o f such an infant reaching personhood w ith the harm ful hum an interven
tion w ould be quite low, i f not zero. I f harm ful hum an choices are excluded from
the probability, then it is difficult to see w hy the hum an fetus— from quite early in
pregnancy— w ould be m uch different than the hum an new born. A fter a pregnancy
is established, m iscarriage— like still-birth or SIDS— is relatively rare, so the hum an
fetus w ould seem to have a high likelihood o f reaching personhood and so w ould
have a high value. This w ould seem to exclude abortion save for the m ost serious
o f reasons; i f not, then one w ould have to endorse infanticide for birth control and
convenience, as takes place in m ost abortions. In other words, i f potential value is
going to do the w ork needed to exclude infant neglect or infanticide, it w ill also
exclude m any abortions— presum ably a view that N obbs does not w ant to em brace,
given his endorsem ent o f som ething like S inger’s view o f personhood, a view ty p i
cally driven by the desire to justify abortion.
A nother difficulty is that in any calculus o f probability and value, both term s
are relevant. In other words, in term s o f shifting the outcom e, i f a value is high
enough, even a low probability yields high probability value. So in adjudicating
am ong various options, not sim ply the probability but also the value involved is
relevant. Considering negative outcom es, it w ould be irrational for me to w ager even
w ith good odds, i f losing the w ager w ould result in, say, therm onuclear devastation.
Put positively, i f the value o f personhood is high enough, even a low probability
o f achieving personhood yields great value, w hich w ould again seem to lead to a
condem nation o f not ju st infanticide but also abortion. If, as Pope John Paul II states,
we affirm “the incom parable value o f every hum an person,”3 then this inestim able
value shifts the probability calculus decidedly against negative interventions on
hum an life even in the face o f low probability.
C onsidered from another perspective, N obbs’s view o f probability potential
ity is unlikely to be persuasive grounds for dem onstrating the problem atic nature
o f infanticide or infant neglect to m any pro-choice advocates. Com m enting on
her ow n exam ple o f a space explorer w hose body contains virtually m illions o f
potential persons, M ary A nne W arren rem arked that the rights o f an actual person
always outw eigh the rights o f how ever m any potential persons.4 I f so, then it is
difficult to see w hat practical difference it w ould m ake i f infants (or other hum an
beings) have greater value the m ore likely it is th at they are to achieve personhood.
It w ould still be perm issible for a couple to take a vacation, leaving their new born
at hom e to die from neglect, since the rights and desires o f actual persons could in
principle never be outw eighed by the rights and desires o f nonpersons, how ever
close to achieving personhood.

3John Paul II, Evangelium vitae (March 25, 1995), n. 2.
4Mary Anne Warren, “The Personhood Argument in Favor of Abortion,” in Life and
Death: A Reader in Moral Problems, 2nd ed., ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wad
sworth, 2000), 265-266.
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A Critique o f the Consistency o f a Pro-life Position
In his article “Pro-Life is Anti-Life: The Problem atic Claim s o f Pro-Life Posi
tions in Ethics,”5 John H arris, a prom inent consequentialist and editor-in-chief o f
the Journal o f Medical Ethics , critiques D avid O derberg’s Moral Theory: A NonConsequentialist Approach w ith rhetorical fireworks characteristically reserved
for partisan college new spapers.6 H arris describes Oderberg, and the pro-life view
generally, as tendentious, unprincipled, hollow, hypocritical, and disingenuous.
A ddressing O derberg’s claim that consequentialism is the dom inant approach in
contem porary applied ethics, H arris retorts, “Obviously Oderberg has never been
to, or even heard about, such W estern countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany,
France, Greece, Eire, Poland, M alta, or alm ost any other country ofW estern Europe
let alone m ost o f the U nited States and South A m erica” (100). Such rem arks do not
contribute to the understanding o f differences, the clarification o f im portant issues,
or the resolution o f disagreem ents.
H arris’s argum ent against Oderberg in part focuses on cases where adherence
to an exceptionless norm against intentionally killing innocent persons leads to
counterintuitive results. For exam ple, Harris believes that the pro-life view w ould
allow the M altese conjoined tw ins M ary and Jodie to both die rather than saving
one by killing the other. Or, in another exam ple, it w ould be forbidden to kill a
hijacker and his innocent hum an shield to prevent an entire plane from crashing
and killing all on board.
A m ore careful study o f the tradition under criticism indicates a m ore com plex
picture. It is true that m any Catholics opposed the separation o f Jodie and M ary on
a num ber o f grounds,7 but other Catholic com m entators,8 m y self included,9 have
argued that the separation was not intentional killing and was justified according
to double-effect reasoning (DER). Likew ise, scholastics follow ing A quinas dealt

5John Harris, “Pro-Life is Anti-Life: The Problematic Claims of Pro-Life Positions
in Ethics,” in Scratching the Surface o f Bioethics, eds. Matti Hayry and Tuija Takala (New
York: Rodopi, 2003): 99-109. Harris writes: “The hollowness of pro-life positions has been
demonstrated in many ways and it will not be my purpose in this short paper to attempt
to catalogue the ways in which such positions are so often wantonly destructive of human
lives and of the value that ‘life’ represents. ... A further dimension of the pro-life position
that has not received the critical attention its hypocrisy merits is the way in which a pro-life
position does not in fact embody an uncompromising and principled stand against killing, but
instead is the articulation and defense of a particular set of justifications for killing normal
human beings” (100, 102).
6David Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-ConsequentialistApproach (Oxford: Black
well, 2000).
7For example, Archbishop Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, “The Conjoined Twins Mary
and Jodie: Ethical Analysis of their Case,” Origins 30.17 (October 5, 2000): 269-272.
8For example, William E. May, “‘Jodie’ and ‘Mary’: Separating the Maltese Twins,”
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1.3 (Autumn 2001): 407-416.
9See Christopher Kaczor, The Edge o f Life: Human Dignity and Contemporary Bio
ethics (New York: Springer, 2005), ch. 8.
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explicitly with cases o f attackers making use of human shields, and some held that
one can defend oneself with lethal force even in such cases. Similarly, I believe that
DER would permit shooting down hijacked aircraft that are being used as missiles,
despite the loss o f life for innocent passengers on board.
Harris misunderstands double-effect reasoning in another way: “It is a clas
sic paradox o f Catholic theology or any philosophy that employs the doctrine o f
double effect that since no one may intend to kill a protected individual those that
do not intend to kill protected individuals are in fact permitted to do so. ... It is
open season on indirect killing” (103, 106). In fact, double-effect reasoning involves
more than simply the requirement that an agent not intend, as a means or an end,
to intentionally kill the innocent. In addition, “indirect killing” is justified only if
there is also a proportionately serious reason for allowing the side effect o f death,
such as defending innocent human life. DER simply does not allow “open season”
for indirect killing.
Finally, since Catholic tradition sanctions the use o f the death penalty and
private self-defense, Harris construes the pro-life position as holding that, “no lives
are intrinsically valuable—valuable because they are lives o f a particular sort o f
creature, the lives o f human beings instead o f animals, as it is sometimes put, o f a
special ‘natural kind.’ We find that pro-life philosophy does not identify a class o f
beings whose lives are intrinsically important” (103). The pro-life position, in other
words, is only pro-innocent life, and hence is inconsistent.
This critique again misrepresents its target. In Catholic theology, as John
Paul II’s Evangelium vitae makes clear, all human beings—without any exception
whatsoever— have dignity because they are endowed by God with a soul, because
they can be redeemed by God, and because they have an eternal destiny. Tradi
tional affirmations o f the right o f the state to perform capital punishment are in no
sense a denial o f the goodness or dignity o f the life o f the condemned. Just as a
fine presupposes the value o f money, and imprisonment presupposes the value o f
liberty, so too capital punishment deprives a wrongdoer o f something valuable and
good—his own life. In cases o f self-defense, on my reading o f the text at least,10
Aquinas taught that one may not intend to kill the attacker but merely to stop the
attack precisely because o f the intrinsic value o f the attacker’s life. To assert that
one may use whatever force is necessary to stop an attack and preserve one’s own
life is not to assert that the attacker’s life is worthless. Left out o f Harris’s critique
entirely are efforts o f the “new natural law” advocates, led by Germain Grisez, to
make the consistency o f the Catholic tradition even more evident.
C hristopher K aczor , P h .D.
The Catholic University o f America
Washington, D.C.

10
Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II, Q 64.7. See also Christopher Kaczor, “Double
Effect Reasoning: From Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer,” Theological Studies 59 (June
1998): 297-316.
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